Bava Kamma 178

דאי מחלה לגבי בעל לא קא מפסיד דהשתא נמי לא מידי קא יהבה ליה סוף סוף כל לגבי בעל ודאי מחלה ואטרוחי בי דינא בכדי לא מטרחינן

for even if she should subsequently release her husband from the obligation, the purchaser<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the injured person. ');">¹</span>

אלא הא דתניא וכן היא שחבלה בבעלה לא הפסידה כתובתה אמאי תזבנינה ניהליה לכתובתה לבעלה בטובת הנאה בהא חבלה דאי מחלה לגבי בעל ליכא פסידא

would lose nothing as now too she pays him nothing on account of the compensation, [my answer is that] as it is in any case quite certain that where there is an obligation on the husband the wife will release him, it would not be proper to trouble the Court of Law so much for nothing. But seeing that it was taught: 'So also if she injures her husband she does not forfeit her <i>kethubah</i>'.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Tosaf. B.K. IX, 8. ');">²</span>

הא ודאי ר"מ היא דאמר אסור לאדם שישהא את אשתו אפילו שעה אחת בלא כתובה

why should she in this case not assign her <i>kethubah</i> to the husband and thus let him have the satisfaction of the benefit as compensation for the injury, for even if she releases her husband from the obligation no loss will result therefrom? — This teaching is surely based on the view of R. Meir who said<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra, p. 515, n. 6. ');">³</span>

וטעמא מאי כדי שלא תהא קלה בעיניו להוציאה הכא מגרש לה וגבי ליה בחבליה מינה אי הכי השתא נמי מגרש לה וגבי ליה בחבליה מינה

that it is prohibited for any man to keep his wife without a <i>kethubah</i> even for one hour, the reason being that it should not be an easy matter in the eyes of the husband to divorce a wife. So also here if the <i>kethubah</i> be assigned to him he might easily divorce her and have her <i>kethubah</i> for himself as compensation for the injury. But if so [even now that the <i>kethubah</i> remains with her] would he just the same not find it easy to divorce her, as he would retain the amount of her <i>kethubah</i> as compensation for the injury? [This however would not be so where] e.g., the amount of her <i>kethubah</i> was much more than that of the compensation as on account of the small amount of the compensation he would surely not risk losing more.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [I.e., the difference between the large amount of the kethubah and the amount due to him as compensation.] ');">⁴</span>

כגון דנפיש כתובתה דמשום ההוא פורתא לא מפסיד טובא

But again if the amount of her <i>kethubah</i> exceeded that of an ordinary <i>kethubah</i> as fixed by the Law,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The Bible, i.e., two hundred zuz where she was a virgin at the time of the marriage. Cf. Ex. XXII, 16; Keth. I, 2. ');">⁵</span>

ואי דנפישא כתובתה מכתובה דאורייתא נוקמא אכתובה דאורייתא ואידך תזבנה ניהליה בחבליה

why should we not reduce the amount to that of the ordinary <i>kethubah</i> fixed by the Law,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [To provide against the prohibition in the view of R. Meir.] ');">⁶</span>

כגון דלא נפישא כתובתה מכתובה דאורייתא דהוי חבליה ארבעה זוזי דמשום ארבעה זוזי לא מפסיד עשרים וחמשה

and she should assign the difference to the husband as compensation for the injury? [This could not be done where,] e.g. the amount of her <i>kethubah</i> did not exceed that of the ordinary <i>kethubah</i> fixed by the Law and the compensation for the injury was assessed to be four <i>zuz</i>, as it is pretty certain that for four <i>zuz</i> he will not risk losing twenty-five [<i>sela'</i>].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' = 100 zuz, which is the minimum amount of a kethubah even in the case of a non-virgin; v. Keth. I, 2. ');">⁷</span>

אלא הא דתניא כשם שלא תמכור והיא תחתיו כך לא תפסיד והיא תחתיו והא זימנין משכח לה דמפסדא והיכי דמי כגון דנפישא כתובתה מכתובה דאורייתא

But what of that which was taught: 'Just as she cannot [be compelled to] assign her <i>kethubah</i><span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [For any damage done to others (Tosaf.).] ');">⁸</span>

אמר רבא סיפא אתאן לכתובת בנין דכרין

so long as she is with her husband, so also she cannot [be compelled to] remit [anything of] her <i>kethubah</i> so long as she is with her husband'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' [For any damage done by her to her husband (Tosaf.) V. Tosaf. B.K. IX.] ');">⁹</span>

והכי קתני כשם שהמוכרת כתובתה לאחרים לא הפסידה כתובת בנין דכרין מאי טעמא זוזי הוא דאנסוה כך מוכרת כתובתה לבעלה לא הפסידה כתובת בנין דכרין מ"ט זוזי הוא דאנסוה

Are there not times when she would be forced to remit, as, for example where the amount of her <i>kethubah</i> exceeded the amount of an ordinary <i>kethubah</i> fixed by the Law? — Said Raba: This concluding paragraph refers to the clause inserted in the <i>kethubah</i> regarding the male children,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which runs as follows: 'The male children which you will have with me shall inherit the amount of your kethubah over and above their appropriate portions due to them together with their brothers (if any of another mother).' V.B.B. (Sonc. ed.) p. 546, n. 16. ');">¹⁰</span>

לימא תקנת אושא תנאי היא דתני חדא עבדי מלוג יוצאין בשן ועין לאשה אבל לא לאיש ותניא אידך לא לאיש ולא לאשה

and what was meant was this: Just as in the case of a wife assigning her <i>kethubah</i> to others she does thereby not impair the clause in the <i>kethubah</i> regarding the male children, the reason being that she might have been compelled to do it on account of a pressing need for money, so should also be the case where a wife assigns her <i>kethubah</i> to her own husband, that she would thereby not impair the clause in the <i>Kethubah</i> dealing with male children on the ground that she might have been compelled to do this for lack of funds.

סברוה דכולי עלמא קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף דמי מאי לאו בהא קא מיפלגי דמאן דאמר לאשה לית ליה תקנת אושא ומ"ד לא לאיש ולא לאשה אית ליה תקנת אושא

May we say that the enactment of Usha was a point at issue between the following Tannaim? For one [Baraitha] teaches that <i>melog</i> slaves are to go out free for the sake of a tooth or an eye<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. Ex. XXI, 26-27. ');">¹¹</span>

לא דכולי עלמא אית להו תקנת אושא אלא כאן קודם תקנה כאן לאחר תקנה

if assaulted by the wife,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who possesses the ownership of their substance. ');">¹²</span>

ואי בעית אימא אידי ואידי לאחר תקנה ואית להו תקנת אושא אלא למאן דאמר לאשה ולא לאיש מאי טעמא כדרבא דאמר רבא

but not if assaulted by the husband,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who has in them but the right of usufruct. ');">¹³</span> whereas another [Baraitha] teaches that [they are not to go out free] when assaulted either by the husband or by the wife. Now it was thought that all authorities agree that a right to usufruct does not constitute in law a right to the very substance. Are we not to suppose then that the point at issue between them was that the one who held that they are to go out free if assaulted by the wife did not accept the enactment of Usha, while the one who held that they are not to go out free when assaulted either by the husband or by the wife accepted the enactment of Usha?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to which the wife would not be able to impair the right of the husband, [nor would the husband on the other hand be able to impair the right of the wife to the slaves whose substance is actually hers.] ');">¹⁴</span> — No; it is quite certain that the enactment of Usha was unanimously accepted, but the former Baraitha was formulated before the passing of the enactment while the other one was formulated after. Or if you like I may say that both the one Baraitha and the other dealt with conditions prevailing after the enactment, and also that both accepted the enactment of Usha, but the authority who held that the slaves are to go out free if assaulted by the wife and not by the husband did so on account of a reason underlying a statement of Raba, for Raba said: